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Abstract: An online survey was undertaken to examine the relationship 
between the intensity of beliefs in paranormal phenomena and two 
facets of a scientific worldview, namely, an appreciation of the values of 
science and a disposition to presumptive scepticism. A sample of 202 
British residents participated in the survey. The findings indicate that 
paranormal believers have both a relatively low regard for the values of 
science and weak dispositional scepticism. These findings are discussed 
in terms of the worldview hypothesis of paranormal belief. 
 





The responses of mainstream scientists to parapsychological research 
have been extensively documented (e.g., Carter, 2012; Irwin & Watt, 2007, 
Ch 17; McClenon, 1984), but such is not the case for some other facets of 
the relationship between science and the paranormal. The objective of the 
present study was to explore empirical associations between belief in 
paranormal phenomena and attitudes to science and scientific values. 
Several comprehensive theories of the development of beliefs in 
paranormal phenomena have been formulated (for a review see Irwin, 
2009), and one of these has been dubbed the worldview hypothesis of 
paranormal belief. According to Zusne and Jones (1982, 1989) beliefs in 
paranormal phenomena are simply an element of a broader worldview, a 
philosophical outlook that is primarily characterised by a highly subjective 
and esoteric perspective on humanity, life, and the world at large. Thus, 
under this “tender-minded” or rationalistic worldview (James, 1907/2009), 
events may be interpreted more in terms of intangible mental and 
metaphysical processes than in relation to observable or physical factors. 
For people who embrace this rationalistic worldview the truth of an idea is 
revealed through contemplation and reflection; that is, the idea is validated  
 




by its consistency both intrinsically and with other endorsed truths 
(Halloran & Kashima, 2004). 
By contrast, people with an “empirical” (James, 1907/2009) 
worldview or “tough-minded”, objective, materialist outlook are inclined 
either to deny or to take no interest in the existence of things that are not 
observable either directly through the human senses or indirectly via some 
technological apparatus; further, they will seek to discern truth through 
systematic, unsentimental observation of external events. The rationalistic 
worldview hypothesis, on the other hand, interprets paranormal belief as a 
product of a broad subjectivism or emotionally driven intuitivism, a 
common human approach to “making sense of the world” (Zusne & Jones, 
1982, p. 192). The rationalistic worldview therefore is in clear contrast with 
a scientific approach which is marked by an emphatic empiricalism (James, 
1907/2009). In this respect the worldview hypothesis of paranormal belief 
implies a negative relationship between the intensity of people’s paranormal 
beliefs and their endorsement of scientific attitudes and values. 
Several reports have documented attitudes to science and technology 
within the general population of the United Kingdom (Castell et al., 2014), 
the USA (National Science Board, 2002), Australia (Cormick, 2014), and 
other Western countries. According to these large scale surveys most 
people, perhaps as much as 80% of the adult population, profess to have 
faith and trust in science and think it is important to know about science, 
although information about scientific issues usually is encountered 
serendipitously, as in media news reports; only a minority of people actively 
search for such information on websites or by deliberately tuning in to 
specialised science programs on the radio or television. A majority also 
concede that science and technology have made substantial contributions to 
the quality of life and to the national economy, particularly in regard to 
health, domestic convenience, and entertainment. 
On the other hand a significant minority are disinterested in science; 
indeed, indications of falling interest among high school students are of 
some concern to economic planners and tertiary education administrations 
(see also Gokhale, Brauchle, & Machina, 2009; Tytler, 2007). Additionally, 
many people express distrust of science and are concerned about the (actual 
or potential) dangers of science and technology to society (e.g., ecological 
and climatic impacts); according to one report (National Science Board, 
2002) barely 55% of the UK population believe the benefits of science 
outweigh its harmful effects. Distrust of or disaffection from science 
therefore is by no means negligible. 
Some of these attitudes to science may well be causally linked with 
belief in paranormal phenomena. Several commentators have argued that 
the prevalence of paranormal beliefs in the general population is a clear 
indication of the inadequacy of the nation’s programs of science education 




(e.g., Singer & Benassi, 1981; Wolpert, 1993/2013). Some surveys have 
established a negative correlation between the extent of people’s education 
in science and the intensity of their paranormal beliefs (e.g., Aarnio & 
Lindeman, 2005; Morier & Keeports, 1994). On the other hand there are 
indications that enrolment in science courses is in itself insufficient to 
reduce the strength of paranormal beliefs; rather, a science syllabus that also 
explicitly probes the claims of so-called “pseudosciences” or otherwise 
emphasises “critical thinking” may be necessary for such an outcome (e.g., 
Manza et al., 2010; Wesp & Montgomery, 1998). The demand 
characteristics inherent in the latter studies nevertheless invite caution in 
inferring that paranormal belief can be attenuated by fostering familiarity 
with science’s emphasis on an attitude of constructive scepticism. There is 
therefore a need to investigate the association between paranormal beliefs 
and a sceptical disposition beyond the context of science education, that is, 
among the population more generally. 
In its more dogmatic form scepticism constitutes closed-minded 
cynicism or a blanket refusal to consider propositions at odds with one’s 
own opinions, but in a scientific worldview scepticism entails a presumptive 
doubt, a suspension of judgement, or a hesitance to trust other people’s 
assertions (e.g., experimental findings) before a critical evaluation of the 
supportive evidence has been undertaken (Chan, 2014). The latter is the 
doctrine of “methodological scepticism” originally advocated by Descartes 
(Bunge, 1991). The converse of scepticism in this sense is an ingrained bias 
to seek only confirmation of one’s views and to ignore all contrary 
evidence. In this respect some studies have indicated that paranormal 
believers are relatively prone to seeking information that is consistent with 
their paranormal beliefs and to discounting the implications of contrary 
ideas (e.g., Blanco, Barberia, & Matute, 2015; Irwin, Dagnall, & 
Drinkwater, 2015; Jones & Russell, 1980). Admittedly this pattern of 
behaviour may well be associated with all manner of one’s cherished beliefs 
(Kurzban, 2010), but nonetheless it does constitute evidence of a relative 
lack of methodological scepticism in paranormal believers; that is, the 
behaviour is consistent with the possibility that believers may lack 
sympathy for a scientific worldview. 
There is some further support for this notion. Clobert and Saroglou 
(2015) found that the intensity of paranormal beliefs is positively related to 
(a single-item index of) distrust of science (in two European countries r = 
.12 and .23, p < .001). Irwin et al. (2015) report that paranormal belief 
correlates negatively with a belief in the values of science (r = -.63, p < 
.001). Additionally, Majima (2015) conducted a study of paranormal belief 
using “science literacy” (knowledge of basic scientific findings) as an 
extraneous variable; at my request he confirmed the direct bivariate 
relationship between paranormal beliefs and science literacy (r = -.16, p < 




.01; Yoshimasa Majima, personal communication, September 29, 2015). On 
the other hand two earlier studies failed to find a significant relationship 
between paranormal beliefs and belief in science (Otis & Alcock, 1982; 
Williams, Taylor, & Hintze, 1989). Further empirical investigation therefore 
could be advantageous. 
In summary, the relationship between paranormal belief and attitudes 
to science warrants examination in two basic respects, as enunciated in the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The intensity of paranormal beliefs is negatively related to a 
general appreciation of the values of science. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The intensity of paranormal beliefs is negatively related to 
an intrinsic disposition for scepticism. 
 
We planned to evaluate these hypotheses through multiple regression 







This study was conducted as the second part of an online 
questionnaire survey. The first part of the survey inventory addressed an 
unrelated hypothesis. Nevertheless, in case the outcomes of the second 
section are suspected to have been affected in some way by the completion 
of questionnaires in the first section, it is appropriate to specify these 
measures here. The first section began with Irwin’s (2015a) task of 
assessing the research program on dermo-optical perception. This was 
followed, in a counterbalanced order, by the Rational-Experiential 
Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), Aberrant Salience Inventory (Cicero, 
Kerns, & McCarthy, 2010), the Reality Testing subscale of the Inventory of 
Personality Organization (Lenzenweger et al., 2001), the Oxford-Liverpool 
Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (Short Form; Mason, Linney, & 
Claridge, 2005), the Emotion-Based Reasoning subscale of the Cognitive 
Biases Questionnaire (Peters et al., 2010), and the Survey of Scientifically 
Unsubstantiated Beliefs (Irwin & Marks, 2013). The findings of this 
separate project will be reported elsewhere (Irwin, Dagnall, & Drinkwater, 
2016). 
The design of the study conformed to the host university’s ethical 
requirements. 
 






A convenience sample of 202 people participated in the study. 
Recruitment was terminated shortly after the target of 200 completions had 
been achieved. There were 53 males and 149 females. The mean age was 
26.93 years (SD = 10.67) with a range of 19–69 years; 5 participants 
declined to report their age. Participants included undergraduates and 
employees from the host university, as well as alumni and similar associates 





The survey inventory began by soliciting basic demographic 
information (age and gender). The second main section of the survey 
inventory comprised the Belief in Science Scale and the Hurrt Professional 
Scepticism Questionnaire, presented in a counterbalanced order. Each of the 
questionnaires will now be described. 
 
Belief in Science Scale (BISS). The BISS (Farias et al., 2013) comprises 10 
statements extolling the virtues of science (e.g., “We can only rationally 
believe in what is scientifically provable”). Respondents are asked to 
indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement with each statement 
on a 6-point scale (1= Strongly Disagree, to 6 = Strongly Agree). A BISS 
score is computed as the average response over the 10 items and thus may 
potentially range from 1.0 to 6.0. Farias et al. (2013) found the BISS to have 
satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .86) and they cite some 
evidence for its validity. Irwin et al. (2015) also reported the scale’s high 
internal consistency (α = .93).  
 
Hurrt Professional Scepticism Questionnaire (PSQ). Most indices of 
dispositional scepticism are designed for a specific context such as the 
purchase of goods by consumers, assessment of environmental or climactic 
claims, and assessment of media credibility (Chan, 2014). The Hurrt 
Professional Scepticism Questionnaire (PSQ; Hurrt, 2010) was designed 
primarily to assess sceptical attitudes in professional auditors, but the items 
are essentially context-free, allowing the questionnaire to be used as an 
index of dispositional scepticism more generally. The PSQ comprises 30 
items addressing facets of sceptical behaviour identified in the 
psychological and cognate literature. Responses are made on a 6-point scale 
(1= Strongly Disagree, to 6 = Strongly Agree), with reverse scoring applied 
to several items with a negative loading. A total PSQ score is computed as 
the average of responses over the 30 items and thus potentially may range 
from 1.0 to 6.0. Hurrt (2010) has documented the reliability and the validity 




of the scale; the internal consistency of the PSQ (Cronbach’s α) is reported 
in several samples to range from .85 to .91, and thus is acceptable. 
Although the PSQ was intended to yield a global score for 
scepticism, Hurrt’s factor analysis of the scale confirmed the presence of six 
components with Cronbach’s α ranging from .67 to .91. The subscales are 
labelled: 
 
• Curiosity (the general inclination to search for knowledge and to 
investigate); 
• Deliberating (reflective decision-making as opposed to intuition); 
• Self-Determining (a reluctance to accept others’ statements or 
claims without making a self-determination); 
• Interpersonal Understanding (curiosity about people that is more 
specific than the general trait of curiosity); 
• Self-Confidence (having the courage to act on one’s curiosity and 
questioning); and 
• Questioning (demanding reasons, evidence, justification or proof). 
 
Scores on these factors are computed as the average of responses to the 
items in the respective subscale and thus can range from 1.0 to 6.0. 
Performance on the six subscales can provide some tentative indications of 
the aspects of dispositional scepticism that have most bearing in an 
observed relationship with the full-scale scores, although it must be 
remembered that the internal consistency of some of these subscales is not 
as high as for the questionnaire as a whole. 
 
Survey of Scientifically Unsubstantiated Beliefs (SSUB). Data from one of 
the measures in the first block of the survey were used to index the intensity 
of paranormal belief. The Survey of Scientifically Unsubstantiated Beliefs 
(SSUB; Irwin & Marks, 2013), labelled the “Survey of Popular Beliefs” for 
general use, is a 20-item self-report interval-level measure of the intensity 
of paranormal and related beliefs. Responses to the SSUB items are made 
on a 5-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, to 5 = Strongly agree). 
The SSUB comprises two scales denoted New Age Beliefs (NAB, 15 
items) and Traditional Religious Beliefs (5 items), but only the former items 
were processed here. The NAB encompasses such New Age beliefs as 
telepathy, astral projection, fortune telling, psychokinesis, astrology, crop 
circles, haunted houses, shamanism, and the like. Scores on the NAB scale 
are computed as the sum of responses to the constituent items and then 
converted to scores with interval-level (Rasch scale) measurement using the 
conversion table provided by Irwin and Marks (2013, Appendix 3). Scores 
for NAB can range from 13.37 to 36.53. The Rasch measure for the NAB 




scale has been standardised with a mean of 25 and a standard deviation of 5. 
Irwin and Marks (2013) have documented the dimensional purity and other 
psychometric characteristics of the SSUB, and generally these appear 
satisfactory. For example, the strong internal consistency of NAB scores is 
attested by Irwin and Marks (2013; Cronbach’s α = .92), Irwin, Dagnall, 






The project was administered as an online study compiled using 
Qualtrics™ Survey Software (Qualtrics Labs Inc., Provo, UT; see 
http://www.qualtrics.com). An invitation to participate was distributed via 
the host university’s internal email system and using also a list of alumni 
and other associates of the university. 
The stated aim of the project was “to survey various popular beliefs 
and relate them to aspects of psychological style”. People aged at least 18 
years were said to be eligible to take part and they were assured their 
participation was anonymous and completely voluntary, with withdrawal 
from the exercise permitted at any time. The need for frankness in 
responding was stressed. The system automatically prevented participation 





Descriptive statistics for the principal variables of the study are given 
in Table 1, together with correlations between paranormal belief (NAB) and 
the predictor variables of belief in the values of science (BISS) and 
dispositional scepticism (PSQ). 
NAB scores were slightly skewed, so Spearman correlations were 
used for these calculations. Probability values are for two-tailed tests after 
Bonferroni corrections were applied on a hypothesis-by-hypothesis basis 
(Abramson et al., 1999; Shaffer, 1995). 
Correlations between NAB and subscales of the PSQ were conducted 
on an exploratory basis and are therefore uncorrected for the multiplicity of 
statistical tests. 
Hypothesis 1 posited a negative relationship between the intensity of 
paranormal beliefs and a general appreciation of the values of science. This 
expectation is supported by the Spearman correlation between NAB and 
BISS, rs(200) = -.55, p <.001, an observation which also confirms the 
finding reported by Irwin et al. (2015), rs(532) = -.63, p < .001. 









A more rigorous assessment of Hypothesis 1 was undertaken by 
taking into account the demographic factors of gender and age with which 
paranormal beliefs are known to vary to some degree (Irwin, 2009). A 
multiple regression was performed with NAB as the dependent variable and 
BISS, gender and age as independent variables. As the distribution of NAB 
scores was not normal the regression analysis was undertaken in 
conjunction with bootstrapping (1000 samples with bias corrected and 
accelerated analyses); bootstrapping is a procedure for using the original 
sample data to estimate a variable’s distribution in the population and 
thereby circumvents the need to meet the statistical requirement for a 
normal distribution of variables (IBM Corporation, 2011). 
The regression equation was significant, F(3, 193) = 31.18, p < .001, 
adjusted R2 = .32, with BISS making an independently significant 
contribution to the regression, partial r(193) = -.54, beta = -.53, t(193) =  
-8.90, p < .001; (female) gender also made a significant contribution, partial 
r(193) = .19, beta =.16, t(193) = 2.70, p < .01. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is 
confirmed. 
Under Hypothesis 2 the intensity of paranormal beliefs and an 
intrinsic disposition for scepticism were predicted to be negatively related. 
This relationship is supported by the Spearman correlation between the 
NAB and the PSQ total score, rs(200) = -.18, p <.01. 
Again, a more incisive assessment of the hypothesis was undertaken 
with a multiple regression of NAB scores on PSQ, gender and age with 
bootstrapping applied. The regression equation was significant, F(3, 194) = 
6.11, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .09, with total PSQ making an independently 
significant contribution to the regression, partial r(194) = -.19, beta = -.19,  
t = -2.74, p < .01; (female) gender also made a contribution, partial r(194) = 
.22, beta =.22, t = 3.11, p < .01. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. It should not be 
assumed, of course, that all facets of dispositional scepticism are implicated 
in this relationship. 
A post hoc multiple regression of NAB on the six PSQ subscales, 
together with gender and age, yielded a significant regression equation, F(8, 
189) = 4.56, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .16, with independently significant 
contributions made by Deliberating, partial r(189) = -.17, beta = -.17, t(189) 
= -2.30, p < .05; Self-Determining, partial r(189) = -.19, beta = -.19, t(189) 
= -2.64, p < .01; and Questioning, partial r(189) = .16, beta = .16, t(189) = 
2.34, p < .01; plus (female) gender, partial r(189) = .21, beta =.21, t(189) = 
3.12, p < .01. 
In light of the finding that both attitudes to science and dispositional 
scepticism are predictors of paranormal belief, readers may speculate that 
one of these independent variables may mediate the relationship between 
paranormal belief and the other independent variable. Exploratory analyses 
indicate this is not the case, in essence because the correlation between 




BISS and PSQ scores was unexpectedly weak, r(200) = .12, p = .079. The 
effects of attitudes to science and of dispositional scepticism on the 






The outcomes of the study may be interpreted as a demonstration that 
paranormal believers in the general population are inclined to discount the 
values of science and to embrace ideas for their emotional appeal rather 
than to subject them to critical scrutiny by considering alternative views. To 
the extent that a presumptive scepticism and an acceptance of the values of 
science are sufficient to characterise a scientific worldview the study’s 
findings lend some support to the rationalistic worldview hypothesis of 
paranormal belief under which believers are deemed to maintain a very 
subjective and anti-materialistic outlook on life (Zusne & Jones, 1982, 
1989). Certainly further research is needed in order to characterise more 
fully the paranormal believer’s worldview, but the conceptual framework of 
worldviews (Chen et al., 2016) does offer a promising avenue for future 
research on paranormal belief. Indeed, if the believer’s worldview and the 
scientific worldview constitute distinct and somewhat antipathetic 
subcultures within contemporary society, perhaps scientific 
parapsychologists can perform a valuable cultural service by seeking to 
bridge these subcultures, fostering the notion that the two worldviews need 
not be mutually exclusive philosophies of life. 
The apparent lack of sympathy for the scientific worldview among 
paranormal believers (Hypothesis 1) is consistent with recent findings on 
this issue (Clobert & Saroglou, 2015; Irwin et al., 2015; Majima, 2015). In 
this regard the study has helped to clarify further the distinctive worldview 
of believers. As noted above, however, the details of this worldview require 
more extensive identification. It would be far too simplistic, for example, to 
conclude that people endorse a belief in paranormal phenomena because 
they do not understand the logic of science. Although the empirical 
literature supports the general view that paranormal believers have little 
sympathy for materialist or rationalist philosophies the motives for such an 
outlook have yet to be conclusively ascertained. 
The relationship between paranormal beliefs and the lack of a 
sceptical disposition (Hypothesis 2) is also a noteworthy observation, but it 
does call for additional empirical probing. Some relevant experimental 
paradigms have been explored in this regard (e.g., Blanco et al., 2015; Jones 
& Russell, 1980), but there is substantial scope for further development. 
The post hoc correlations between paranormal belief and the factors of 




scepticism may suggest some more specific issues for scrutiny. Thus, in this 
project the statistically most important factors of scepticism were identified 
as Deliberating, Self-Determining, and Questioning. The role of the 
Deliberating factor, an index of a preference for reflective decision-making, 
brings to mind previous findings of a negative relationship between 
paranormal beliefs and a rational-analytic processing style (e.g., Aarnio & 
Lindeman, 2005; Irwin & Young, 2002); the link between Deliberating 
scepticism and the rational-analytic thinking style deserves investigation. 
Potentially instructive also may be a project entailing the systematic 
manipulation of deliberative processes in the context of an experimental 
induction of a paranormal belief (e.g., see Irwin, 2015a,b). Note, however, 
that the contribution of the Questioning factor in the regression analysis for 
Hypothesis 2 may well be artefactual; the partial correlation in the 
regression equation (partial r = .16, p < .01) is unexpectedly positive and 
may therefore represent a so-called suppressor effect (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1996, p. 165), serving merely to sharpen the discriminative value of the 
Deliberating and Self-Determining factors in the regression. In any event 
the role of a “questioning” disposition in the intensity of paranormal beliefs 
does deserve follow-up investigation. The correlative status of the study’s 
findings must also be kept in mind; any causal model of the development of 
paranormal beliefs warrants experimental confirmation. 
The weakness of the relationship between dispositional scepticism 
and the endorsement of the values of science was not anticipated. We may 
have implicitly assumed that scientific education would foster both of these 
characteristics and thereby enhance the consistency between them. 
Nonetheless the development of scepticism is not confined to the context of 
scientific education (Mills, 2013; Mills & Elashi, 2014). Other cultural 
contexts which promote dispositional scepticism therefore could be 
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